Combining R&D and Follow-on Production in a Single Contract by Simmons, John W.
The Space Congress® Proceedings 1966 (3rd) The Challenge of Space 
Mar 7th, 8:00 AM 
Combining R&D and Follow-on Production in a Single Contract 
John W. Simmons 
Contracts Manager, Radiation Incorporated 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/space-congress-proceedings 
Scholarly Commons Citation 
Simmons, John W., "Combining R&D and Follow-on Production in a Single Contract" (1966). The Space 
Congress® Proceedings. 4. 
https://commons.erau.edu/space-congress-proceedings/proceedings-1966-3rd/session-8/4 
This Event is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Conferences at Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in The Space Congress® 
Proceedings by an authorized administrator of Scholarly 
Commons. For more information, please contact 
commons@erau.edu. 
COMBINING R & D AND FOLLOW-ON PRODUCTION 
IN A SINGLE CONTRACT
John W. Simmons
Contracts Manager
Radiation Incorporated
Melbourne, Florida
SUMMARY
During the past three years there has been a concentrated 
effort by the Government to shift from Cost-Plus-Fixed 
Fee Contracts to Incentive Contracts. The basic purpose 
of this shift is to put more of the burden of financial 
risk on the contractor and to reward contractors who 
successful ly perform on their contracts with higher profits.
Another trend is developingof combining R & D, Production 
and Logistics Support into a single contract based upon 
Air Force Secretary Charles 1 "Total Package Concept 1 '.
Since the purpose of these changes is to shift more 
risks from the Government to the Contractor, the tendency 
is often to select the type of contract whereby the contractor 
assumes the maximum risk. This of course is the Fixed 
Price Contract. However, due to the nature of the 
circumstances surrounding the procurement, the Fixed 
Price Contract may not be the most appropriate nor 
in the best interests of the Government.
The purpose of this Article is to describe a type of 
Contract for use when it is desired to combine R & D 
and Production in a single contract. In designing this 
contract, it is a goal to reduce or eliminate problems 
which have caused concern to the Government and still 
not go to the extreme and require the contractor to assume 
more risk than sound business judgment would dictate.
COMBINING R & D AND FOLLOW-ON PRODUCTION IN 
A SINGLE CONTRACT
As a result of Defense Secretary McNamara's famous 
11 July 1963 Press Conference on cost reduction, there 
has been an intensive effort by both DOD and NASA to 
shift from Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) to Incentive 
Type Contracts.
Since Government procurement envelops the total span 
of the research and development spectrum as well as the 
procurement of hardware and services, it is obvious that 
one type of contract will not fitall procurement situations. 
It is also basic to our free enterprise system that high 
incentives breed high performance.
There is no argument with the basic principles involved 
in the shift from Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee to Cost-Plus- 
Incentive-Fee, Fixed Price Incentive and Fixed Price 
Contracts. However, the selection of the type of contract 
should be based upon the circumstances of the specific 
procurement and not by pressures external to the 
procurement. Consideration must be given to such 
things as:
1. Is the requirement within the state-of-the-art?
2. Is the work sufficiently defined to permit 
accurate pricing?
3. Is there sufficient cost history to permit accurate 
pricing?
4. Are there unknowns which require large con­ 
tingencies in pricing?
5. What are the possible maximum and minimum 
costs?
Instead of basing the type of contract on the above, 
the type of contract is often influenced by the following:
1. Meeting statistical goals showing a shift toward 
Incentive and Fixed Price contracts.
2. Inadequate project funds or internal administra­ 
tive directives and pressures do not permit the 
Government to assume the. risk of a cost 
overrun. Hence, straight Fixed Price is used 
where, based on the conditions surrounding the 
particular procurement, CPIF or FPI should 
have been used. Use of a contract type of a 
higher order than is appropriate for the procure­ 
ment conditions requires tke contractor to either 
bit a large contingency or assume a higher risk 
than sound business judgment would dictate. In 
such cases the small but perhaps more efficient 
businessman must no-bid because he cannot afford 
to take such a risk. The result is a restriction 
on competition and a strong possibility of higher 
overall cost to the Government.
In the past, DOD has used the following guidelines for 
determining the type of contract appropriate for a particular 
procurement:
CPFF Research programs where the state-of-the- 
art is being pushed and feasibilities proven.
CPIF Development programs and some initial 
production. Development programs, by de­ 
finition, will have no state-of-the-art 
problems, satisfactory specifications, and 
will merely require management of 
engineers.
FPI Initial production where cost data is not 
sufficient to permit fixed price.
FP Production where competition or cost data 
is sufficient to determine fair and reasonable 
price.
During the past year some agencies of Government have 
been giving consideration to combining the R & D phase 
and the production phase in a single contract. Some of 
the reasons given for this are:
1. The desire to have the initial production ac­ 
complished by the R & D contractor because 
of the R & D contractor's knowledge of the 
program technical requirements.
2. Too much time is lost between the R & D 
phase and production phase if a new competitive 
procurement cycle must be run prior to 
production.
3. Unless an initial production is accomplished by 
the R & D contractor, production drawings are 
not sufficiently accurate and complete to permit 
a new competitive procurement which will be 
void of scope changes caused by incorrect 
drawings and specifications.
4. When R & D is procured separately, the R & D 
contractor may ' 'buy-in' ' on the R & D contract 
with the expectation of recovering losses on a 
sole source production follow-on.
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Since a combined R & D and production contract on a 
CPFF, CPIF or FPI basis still permits the use of the 
"buy-in 11 technique, the trend has been toward Fixed 
Price even though the procurement may involve substantial 
development, no cost history, and many cost unknowns.
It therefore appears that a new type of contract is 
needed to cover combined R & D and production contracts 
which involve high financial risks and cost unknowns. 
It is the purpose of this article to describe such a 
contract.
In developing a contract for this type of procurement, 
consideration should be given to the fo I lowing requirements:
1. The contract should discourage buy-in on the 
R & D phase with the goal of making up losses 
on production.
2. The contract should discourage inflating costs 
in the R & D phase with the view of obtaining 
a higher price on the production phase.
3. The contract should protect the contractor 
from severe financial loss due to unforeseeable 
circumstances which are beyond the control of 
the contractor but inherent in a development 
program with many cost unknowns.
4. Protect the contractor from default on the 
production phase because the R & D phase 
turns out to be an impossible task.
The proposed contract consists of two phases. Phase 
1 (R & D) for the design development fabrication and 
test of the first unit or system inlcuding all required 
documentation such as drawings, specifications, manuals, 
test procedures, spare parts lists, etc.
Phase II is for the follow-on production.
Phase I for the R & D could be either Cost Plus Fixed 
Fee, Cost Plus Incentive Fee, Fixed Price Incentive 
or perhaps Fixed Price depending upon the final spe­ 
cifications negotiated.
There are some advantages offered to the Government 
by each type not offered by the others.
The CPFF offers greatest flexibility for technical 
direction by the Government but at a sacrifice of cost 
control.
The CPIF has been found generally to be more suitable 
for R & D because of the administrative flexibility 
desired where there may be numerous scope changes 
which often occur as the development program progresses 
and which require fast reaction but at the same time 
contains incentive for cost control. CPIF is also more 
of a best efforts contract which is used where technical 
achievement may not be possible.
The Fixed Price Incentive offers to the Government 
the advantage of a maximum price for which it will be 
obligated. It also requires specific performance by 
the contractor in that all specifications must be met. 
If they are not met the Government has a choice of 
defaulting the contractor or reducing the specifications 
to those actually achieved.
This type of contract is very risky for the contractor 
when it is known in advance that state-of-the-art is 
involved.
The Fixed Price contract is essentially the same as 
Fixed Price Incentive except the contractor must include 
in the price an allowance for contingencies. If the 
contingencies do not occur then the allowance becomes 
profit.
Final determination on the type of contract for Phase 
1 should be a part of the contract negotiations.
Phase 1 1 for the production could be included as a part 
of the original contract or as an option in the original 
contract. The advantage of including Phase 11 as an 
option is that at the conclusion of Phase 1 the Government 
may elect not to exercise the option and go out jm 
competitive bids without having to go through termination 
proceedings. Whether an option or as part of the basic 
contract, the contractor is not liable for Phase 11 until 
phase 1 is accepted.
The type contract for Phase 11 would be Fixed Price 
Incentive with successive targets. This is not a new type 
contract because it is currently contemplated by ASPR in 
ASPR 3-404.4.
For purposes of illustration, following is an example 
Fixed Price Incentive contract with successive targets 
as envisioned for this type procurement. All of the 
dollar values, percentages and ratios would be negotiable. 
However, typical values have been used in the example.
The initial R & D contract would contain a formula for 
determining the elements of a Fixed Price Incentive firm 
contract upon completion of the R & D phase using cost 
data accumulated during the R & D phase.
A typical example of the formula is as follows:
Initial Target Cost 
Initial Target Profit 
Minimum Profit 
Maximum Profit 
Final Cei ling Price
ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS:
$90M 
$10M 
$ 3M 
$17M
120% Final (Firm) 
Target Cost
A. Minimum profit shall be reached at the point 
where costs equal 130% of initial target cost.
B. Maximum profit shall be reached at the point 
where costs equal 80% of initial target cost.
C. The formula for determining the firm target 
profit is displayed graphically In Graph No. 1 
and is developed by joining points A, B, C, D 
and E by straight lines between the consecutive 
points. These points represent the following:
POINT
A. Maximum Profit 
S72M cost
($17M) at all points below
B. Maximum Profit (517M) at 80% initial target 
cost
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C. Initial target profit ($10M) at initial target 
cost ($90M)
D. Minimum profit ($3M) at 130% initial target 
cost (130% x $90M = $117M)
E. Minimum Profit ($3M) at all points above $1 17M 
cost
This series of interconnecting lines (AB, BC, CD and 
DE) represent graphically the formula for determining 
the firm target profit.
Upon completion of Phase 1 or at the point near com­ 
pletion of Phase 1 where the design and fabrication 
of the first system is sufficiently complete that the 
design is frozen and it is proven that the design meets 
all specifications, then the cost of Phase 11 is rees- 
timated using the historical cost data from Phase 1 plus 
new vendor quotes for materials and subcontracts and 
a firm target cost for Phase 11 is negotiated.
By going to the Graph (Graph No. 1) the firm target 
profit is determined by locating the firm target cost 
and picking the point where the firm target cost inter­ 
sects the profit line.
For example:
If Firm Target 
Cost Is:
$130M 
S105M
$ 90M 
$ 70M
Firm Target 
Profit Is:
$ 3M 
$ 6.1M 
$10M 
$17M
Although the formula for determining firm target profit 
has been shown graphically, it can also be calculated 
mathematically. The slopes of the lines BC and CD 
are equivalent to share ratios and can be calculated
as follows:
Maximum Profit - Target Profit
The Slope of BC = Initial Target Cost - 80% Initial 
Target Cost
$17M - $10M 7M
Slope of BC = $90M - $72M = $18M = ,39
This is the same as a 61/39 share ratio where the con­ 
tractor's share is 39..
Initial Target Profit - Minimum Profit
The Slope of CD = 130% Initial Target Cost - Initial 
Target Cost
$10M - $3M $ 7M 
Slope of CD - $117M - $90M= $27M = .26
This is the same as a 74/26 share ratio where the con­ 
tractor's share is 26.
The firm target profit can therefore be calculated mathe­ 
matically as follows:
Firm Target Profit = Initial Target Profit + (Initial 
Target Cost - Firm Target Cost) Contractor's Share
If Firm Target Cost equals S105M, then Firm Target 
Profit = $10M + ($90M - $104M) .26 =$6.1M
If Firm Target Cost equals $80M, then Firm Target 
Profit = $10M +($90M - $80M) .39 - $13,9M
During the initial contract negotiations, the share ratios 
which will be applicable to the final P'hase 11 contract 
are negotiated and included as part of the initial contract.
Typical share ratios which might be negotiated are as 
fol lows:
1. If the Firm Target Cost is' equal to or greater 
than 130% of Initial Target Cost, the share 
ratios are as follows:
Overrun: 95/5 to ceiling
Underrun: 100/0 down to 130% of initial target 
cost, then
90/10 down to initial target cost, then 
80/20 below initial target cost
2. Firm Target Cost between Initial Target Cost 
and 130% of Initial Target Cost:
Overrun: 90/10
Underrun: 90/10 down to initial target cost, then 
80/20 below initial target cost
3. Firm Target Cost less than Initial Target Cost:
Overrun: 
Underrun:
80/20 
80/20
After completion of the negotiations of the Firm Target 
Cost, the final Fixed Price Incentive formula for Phase 
1 1 can be structured.
Assuming that the Firm Target Cost is $110,000,000, 
the incentive formula will be as shown In Graph No. 2 
and consists of the followingas shown in Table I.
The dashed lines on Graph 2 represent the incentive 
formula for the final Fixed Price Incentive contract 
for Phase 1 1 and superseded the formula represented
by the solid lines.
If desired, the Firm Target Cost and Profit for Phase 
1 1 can be combined with the cost and profit on Phase 1 
(if Phase 1 Is FPI, CPIF or CPFF) and the final contract 
firm target cost and profit can cover both Phase 1 and 
Phase 11. For example:
Using Graph 2, the firm Phase 1 1 formula is as shown 
in Tab Jell.
Assume that Phase 1 was CPFF with an estimated cost 
of $10,000,000 and fixed fee of $800,000. Further assume 
that the final cost was $15,000,000. Phase 1 when added 
to the firm Phase ]1 formula would give the results shown 
in Table 111.
If it Is desired to break the contract into pieces to cover 
multi-year funds, this can also be accomplished by bidding 
the first year alone; by bidding the 1st and 2nd years 
together; by bidding the 1st, 2nd and 3rd together, etc.
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Graphs 3 and 4 show two additional examples for two 
different firm target costs.
The Graphs are based on the following examples shown 
in Table IV.
To illustrate that this concept will discourage under­ 
estimation of initial target costs and discourage trying 
to inflate costs in Phase 1 to achieve a higher target 
cost in Phase 11, let's look at two examples:
Example 1 - Suppose the original estimate to 
do the job was $110,000,000 but in order to get 
the job, the contractor bid an initial target cost 
of $90,000,000 realizing that the firm target 
would be based on Phase 1 actual cost data. 
Assume that Phase 1 actual costs showed that a 
firm target of $110,000,000 was reasonable for 
Phase 11 and that actual costs turned out to be 
$110,000,000. Based upon the above formula, 
the contractor's actual profit would be about 
$4,800,000 (see Graph No. 5 Point B). If he 
had originally bid an initial target cost 
of $110,000,000 his profit would have been 
$12,200,000 (Point A). Therefore, the underbid 
cost $7,400,000 in profit with no way of making 
it up since this is the total production requirement.
Example 2 - Assume an initial target cost of 
$90,000,000 with initial target profit, maximum 
profit, minimum profit and share ratios as in 
Graph No. 6, and suppose the Phase 1 costs 
show that the $90,000,000 is a good figure for 
production but in order to get a high ceiling in 
Phase 1 1, the contractor pads his numbers and 
negotiates a firm target cost of $1 10,000,000. 
In this case, the profit based on a $90,000,000 
actual cost would be about $6,800,000 (see Graph 
No. 6 Point A). If he had not padded his figures 
and used the $90,000,000 as a firm target, the 
profit would have been $10,000,000 (Point B) so 
he gave up $3,200,000 in profit to get a higher 
cei ling.
From these two examples, it can be seen that the con­ 
tractor maximizes his profit when the firm target cost 
is less than the initial target cost. Competition in the 
initial procurement keeps the contractor fromoverbidding 
on the initial target cost. This approach, therefore, 
offers the contractor a powerful profit incentive: (1) 
To give his best true estimate of the initial target cost; 
(2) To find ways of reducing production costs through 
cost conscious engineering design; (3) Upon completion 
of Phase 1, to give his best true estimate of the firm 
target cost; and (4) Throughout Phase 1 1 to continue 
to find ways to reduce costs.
This approach also reduces the severe risk imposed by 
a straight Fixed Price contract on a program with 
R & D and inadequate cost data for bidding Fixed Price, 
and thereby permits many companies to bid who would 
otherwise be forced to withdraw from the competition.
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TABLE I
Firm Target Cost: 
Firm Target Profit: 
Ceiling (120% Firm Target Cost) 
Share Ratios: Overrun 
Underrun
$110,000,000 
4,800,000 
132,000,000 
90/10 to Ceiling 
90/10 to $90,000,000 
80/20 under $90,000,000
TABLE II
Firm Target Cost 
Firm Target Profit 
Final Ceiling
Share Ratios: Overrun 
Underrun
$110,000,000 
$ 4,800,000 
120% Firm Target Cost
($132M)
90/10 to Ceiling 
90/10 to $90M 
80/20 under $90M
TABLE III
Firm! Target Cost
Firm Target Profit
Final Ceiling
Share Ratio:
Overrun
Underrun
Firm Phase II
$110M
$4.8M
$132M
90/10 to Ceiling
90/10 to $90M
80/20 under $90M
Change
Add $15M
(Phase 1 Cost)
Add $.8M
(Phase 1 Fee)
Add $15.8M
(Phase 1 Cost & Fee)
None
Add $15M to Limit
(Phase 1 Cost)
Add $15M to Limit
(Phase 1 Cost)
Combined
Phase 1 & II
$125M
$5.6M
$147.8M
90/10 to Ceiling
90/10 to $105M
80/20 to $105M
Firm Target Cost 
Firm Target Profit 
Ceiling
Share Ratios: Overrun 
Underrun
TABLE IV
Graph 3
$13.9M
$96M 
80/20 
80/20
Graph 4
$117M
$ 3M
$140M
95/5 to Ceiling 
90/10 to $90M 
80/20 under $90M
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